**African-led Interventions in Human Security:**

# Genesis, Endowment, Capacity and Good Practices for Shaping a new Paradigm

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Contents

## Abbreviation and acronyms

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| ACHA | African Centre for Humanitarian Action | NEPAD | New Partnership Agenda for African Development |
| AHA | Africa Humanitarian Action | | |
| APSA | AU-NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda | R2A | Right to Assistance |
| AU | African Union | R2P | Responsibility to Protect |
| CD | Capacity Development | RECs | Regional Economic Commissions |
| COMESA | Common Market for Eastern and Southern African Countries | RPM | Regional Partnership Management |
| | | SADC | Southern African Development Cooperation |
| CSOs | Civil society organisations | | |
| ECCAS | Economic Community for Central African States | UMA | Union of Maghreb States |
| | | UN GA | United Nations General Assembly |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community for Western African States | UN | United Nations |
| | | UNHCR | United Nations High Commission for Refugees |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development | | |

Summary

The 21st Century has ushered in a time of unprecedented global wealth and extraordinary opportunities; but Africa is mired in forced population movements have yet to benefit from this. Conflicts, corruption, disasters, poverty, and pandemics now threaten the region with a calamity unforeseen even during the Great African Famine of the 1980s that affected 150 million Africans. While many proposals for remedial action have been formulated for vulnerability and poverty that haunt the region, real commitment to collaborative processes at the inter-organizational level has always been limited. Mobilizing the action required has also remained a daunting challenge, as many practical and structural constraints militate against commitment by individual groups to inter-organizational initiatives nationally and regionally.

Many conventional and preconceived notions have been questioned and new ideas proposed. The need for collective learning about our responses, and the responsibility to those whose suffering provided the basis for that learning will never be more urgent than it is now. Unfortunately, such lessons, which may be learned through the shocks administered by an uncompromising reality, are rarely translated quickly into personal or organizational memories and the inherent will to change. The reasons for this are sometimes rooted in human inertia, weakness, and self-interest. They are equally often the products of a genuine confusion about how to act most effectively in an environment that seems to be growing more complex.

**To every human problem in Africa, there is always a solution that is smart, simple, and immoral. Important stakeholders tend to have a linear way of thinking that is inadequate to unravel the many complex inter-relationships underlying people's insecurity. It is neither popular nor scientific. The need for the fundamental change on how the global community deals with the internecine crises must change since places such as Darfur, Somalia, Chad and DRC, have become a new insignia of 'bestiality'. It must take, within the premises of Human Security, R2P and R2A, and encourage appropriate action for promoting and managing an enabling environment for human development; in addition to mainstreaming peace, security and participatory developmental response – people acting as citizens of a political society, reinforcing ownership of security and ensuring livelihood continuity.**

The first set of limitations relate to a tendency to narrow capacity development thought and practice to the terms and categories of immediate, not very well considered, political and social action, a naive realism, as it were. Secondly, the limitations arise from inattention to problems of articulation or production of capacity development systems and process within African polities rather than simply as formal or abstract possibilities. Thirdly, the ambiguity as to whether civil society is the agent or object of CD and a nearly exclusive concern in certain institutional perspectives on CD in Africa with generic attributes and characteristics of political organisations and consequent neglect of analysis in terms of specific strategies and performances of organisations in processes of transition to capacity. In addition, there is the inadequate treatment of the role of international agencies and the relations between global and indigenous aspects or dimensions of capacity development in Africa. The need for the fundamental change on how the global community deals with the internecine crises must change; hence, the emergence of capacity development strategies, international conventions and humanitarian codes of conduct.

## 1) Introduction

A quarter of a century after the Great African Famine and Ban Aid, Africa is in the grip of an unprecedented crisis, heightened by the inability of homegrown African organizations to readily engage in the search for solutions to the continent's problems. The UN Special Session on Africa (1986), which resulted in the creation of the UN Programme for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAHARD), demonstrated that the international community was committed to helping Africa in its struggle against underdevelopment and poverty. Nonetheless, two decades later, Africa struggles to be at the forefront of the global development agenda.

Across the continent, people are forcibly displaced from their homes and countries for several reasons, the most common being conflict and /or natural disaster related. Whilst some countries are currently emerging from conflict, others such as the Sudan, DRC and Somalia, remain in the throws of violence, causing thousands to flee and seek safety. Elsewhere in the continent, populations continue to suffer the devastating results of natural disasters, such as droughts and floods. In 2007 alone, 18 countries across Africa were severely affected by floods, forcing an estimated 1.5 million people to flee their homes and seek drier ground.

On a positive note, millions of displaced persons have been able to experience a voluntary, safe, and dignified return home. However, with an estimated 22 million people, remaining forcibly displaced across the continent, but significant challenges remain. Due to the protracted nature of many African conflicts, a substantial proportion of those affected have been in displacement for years and in some cases decades. Whilst the need for assistance remains paramount, donor fatigue is placing vulnerable populations at risk of dwindling support. The protection and assistance that people receive is already very basic, a drop in which would be catastrophic. Therefore, it is essential that adequate funds are secured and African organizations are supported to ensure the necessary protection and assistance, and the ability to empower populations in positively contributing to achieving durable solutions to the challenges Africa faces.

Neither international aid nor international interventions on their own have significantly reduced vulnerability nor brought enduring solutions. An enhanced involvement of well-resourced and well-equipped African actors could improve both the effectiveness of interventions and the sustainability of subsequent recovery programmes. It will, however, require a shift of both mindset and approach to humanitarian aid delivery. Today, African organizations suffer from insufficient funding to up-grade competences and structures to a competitive level, missing reliable longer-term institutional development as funding allocated to them is mostly tied to short-term, earmarked service-delivery programmes. They are particularly lagging behind in information technology, which has transformed humanitarian relief beyond recognition in the last decade.

Faced with this situation, Africans have developed their own perception of development, which can help solve the problems facing the continent. The proliferation of organisations of peasant and village women with links to African NGOs and civil society is a good indication of Africa's ability to rely upon itself, something of which African NGOs are well aware.

Hence, this document outlines a transformational change in African led directions towards addressing the root causes of forced displacement and human migration. The directional change entails addressing issues of human security that seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf and to forge a global alliance against forced displacement. Human security thus brings together the human elements of security, of rights, and of development; based on the tents of the UN Commission on Human Security and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

2) **Methodology and protocols to assess Human Insecurity**

a) **Social capital and human security:** There is a vast and growing, if recent, literature on associational life in Africa. Much of this literature is an important and much needed corrective to the afro-pessimism prevailing in policy circles in the West. Having despaired of revamping the supposedly derelict African state, researchers and some policy makers have averted their gaze to social movements and groups, optimistic that these, if re-invigorated, may organically lead to stronger and more democratic states in the continent. Whereas these movements were once perceived as the touchstone of democratic transition and consolidation, their brief has been widened. Researchers and policy makers alike see them as the harbingers of development and the solution to the deep poverty that afflicts the continent.

The need for an assessment of human insecurity in CSOs is all too obvious. CSOs must come forward as a political forum emerging as the regions première think tank that would set the paradigmatic shifts on human security and R2P, human development and popular participation – where people acting as citizens of a political society, reinforce ownership of development and ensure continuity. The prospects, nature and outcomes of human welfare and state sustainability will depend on CSO's ability to help nations and people's of the region to foster the rules of the game (as manifest in political rules) and the configuration of national institutions (as manifest in political institutions) in state and civil society. CSO's visions must be firmly rooted in building pluralism, nations and states governed by justice, and respect for rights of citizens in the Horn of Africa. Its reign must extend from ensuring livelihoods to ensuring human security and R2P, gender equality, advancement in governance, alternative conflict management, and diplomacy.

The overarching goal is to generate information that can be used to review the scale of crime and the criminal justice systems in countries undergoing the APRM. This ultimate goal is to enhance the implementation of NEPAD programmes. Crime is a cross cutting issue in all the four areas identified in the NEPAD Declaration (democracy and political governance, economic governance and management; corporate governance and socio-economic development) and containing it is essential for enhancing human security and R2P as well as achieving the levels of development envisaged by the continent. Different countries experience different rates of crime and though management of the criminal justice hinges on accepted principles, there are some variations across countries in the levels of performance and the determinant factors equally vary. Participating country partners will thus agree on the methods to be used in each area of study, taking into account each country's specificities, as indicated in the questionnaire. Sharing information would be essential for the success of the project and will enhance the quality of work by the country team.

The study will proceed in a number of stages": "firstly it is the engagement of country partners and preparing the questionnaire for the country's local context. This would be done through the aid of the country background report. An issue paper derived from this document will guide the actual study. Selected Partners will write brief R2P action plans on how they intend to proceed with the study. They will also compile a list of stakeholders and other likely respondents to interviews they will conduct. Intended visits to institutions, e.g. prisons must also be indicated and later documented. Secondly, in country workshop during which studies pertaining to all sections would be discussed, thirdly, fieldwork/data collection by the partners and analysis of the findings, discussion of preliminary report and finally it is to finalise the country report/ drafting of policy documents/ prep for publication and policy briefings with relevant stakeholders followed by general dissemination of the findings."

b) In the following is outlined the kind and types of information to be gathered, data collection techniques to be used and the analysis system that would be utilised to organise, interpret and present findings in HS assessment. For clarity purposes, we have organised the information to be collected in line along the major components of the assignment. Applied data collection will focus on participatory, affordable, easy to understand and useful techniques. Stakeholders at all levels would be consulted for their views, experience, and inputs to the assessment process. They would fully participate in identification of lessons learned and formulation of recommendations. Information gathering/ data collection and analysis would be conducted in close co-ordination and consultation with all stakeholders and regional bureau authorities. In order to obtain the informa-

tion needed to answer the above questions, the following data collection techniques would be used.

i)   SWOT workshops;

ii)  Primary and secondary data collection in addition to the primary field data, secondary data would be collected from different organisations to feed in into the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process. A series of interview instruments that reflect the range of issues and questions contained in the strategy and mechanism development process would be developed and administered. The questions would be designed to collect a wide range of factual and attitudinal data on the peace and security strategy and mechanism development process. A series of questions would be asked on issues related to programme objectives, practices and in addition to these factual questions, the survey will consist of certain attitudinal questions, which will probe communities' perception of problems and needs and how the peace and security strategy and mechanism relates and affects these needs and problems;

iii) Key Informants and electronic Focus Group discussions

iv)  Data Analysis: The information collected through review of documents, personal interviews and group's discussions would be analysed within the framework of the study objectives. Data collected through structured questionnaires would be edited, coded, and analysed. Data obtained from official records would be analysed using content analysis techniques. Qualitative data would be used to enrich, illustrate, and elaborate on the quantitative findings. Both the qualitative and quantitative analysis will focus on answering the study questions as specified in the toolkit.

## 3) Genesis

### a) Challenges that lead to the humanitarian crises

African Humanitarian CSOs (HCSOs) face many limitations in the sphere of institutional development. Various recommendations and declarations aimed at addressing people's organisations' institutional problems have been made in recent years. Mobilising the action required has, however, remained a daunting challenge, as many practical and structural constraints militate against commitment by individual groups to inter-organisational initiatives, either nationally or regionally.

- Although they have a lot to contribute as a first line of protecting human security and in their advocacy roles, African HCSOs have been unable to establish a clear and coherent voice nationally on issues, which are crucial to their work or to the interest of the local communities, they serve. While many people's and community based organisations proposals for remedial action have been formulated, real commitment to collaborative processes at the inter-organisational level has always been limited. Closely linked with this is the tendency of voluntary sector groups in the region to place a high priority on their external links. The external focus undermines local organisations' legitimate mission as co-actors in the struggle of communities for self-empowerment.

- The absence of effective networks which speak for them, coordinate their relations, represent their interests and advocate their position on important national issues, has hindered their ability to make collective demands on some important issues. On a programmatic level, an effective, well-coordinated body would have allowed them to undertake certain tasks, which are beyond the financial and technical abilities of individual NGOs. Individually many NGOs grapple with similar issues of institutional development and operational efficiency.

- One of the problems, which characterises indigenous people's organisations, is the lack of system programmatic focus and the tendency to go from one sectoral project to another depending on available funding. In addition, once the external support for any project is exhausted the people's organisations take up whatever activities the donors are funding. The inability to specialise in a particular area of competence renders organisational learning irrelevant and makes continuity of a particular agenda and goals impossible. Moreover, as a sectoral interest group, they remain institutionally weak. This fact compromises the potential for sustainability in their programmes. The external pressures, which often characterise their search for project funds, are partly a result of their institutional inco-

herence, and their limited capacity for advocacy. A lot of African CSOs invariably lack institutional memories and, hence, the reflective capacity and absence of professionalism in their work and the ability to take stock of where they are going, what they have learned and what lessons can be passed on to others.

- African NGOs and people's organisations have yet to demonstrate capacity to master the technical skills to engage meaningfully in dialogue with governments on these issues. Beyond platitudes and good intentions, many civil institutions cannot participate in dialogue with donors and governments because they lack the personnel with requisite skills and facilities to inform their arguments or present credible data to support their assertions. Far more critical in determining both the level and quality of dialogue between governments and civil society is the political and economic context in which African states find themselves. The context for dialogue, cooperation, and interface between states and people's organisations has so far been determined largely by the pressures of the international community.

Hence, capacity developers of African HCSOs should be determined to change this by taking this first step in the long process of sustainable institutional development, which in the end will reduce Africa's dependence on international charity.

b) **Political foundations of the African CSO Humanitarian Response**

i) Analytical problems in current perspectives on CSO humanitarian action capacity development (CD): the theoretical basis for capacity has not been elucidated well in the annals of CD conceptual and analytical process in the international CD system. Indeed, current discussions and analyses of transition to capacity in Africa generally are marked by several limitations. The first set of limitations relate to a tendency to narrow capacity development thought and practice to the terms and categories of immediate, not very well considered, political and social action, a naive realism, as it were. Secondly, the limitations arise from inattention to problems of articulation or production of capacity development systems and process within African polities rather than simply as formal or abstract possibilities. Thirdly, the ambiguity as to whether civil society is the agent or object of CD and a nearly exclusive concern in certain institutional perspectives on CD in Africa with generic attributes and characteristics of political organisations and consequent neglect of analysis in terms of specific strategies and performances of organisations in processes of transition to capacity. In addition, there is the inadequate treatment of the role of international agencies and the relations between global and indigenous aspects or dimensions of humanitarian CD. Let us look at each of these analytical limitations more closely.

(1) The notion of **naive realism** is invoked here to point to certain conceptual shortcomings in current perspectives on CD reform in Africa. These shortcomings can be seen as outcomes of more or less conscious attempts of indigenous governments and their international backers to get their hands quickly on "urgent" or "practical" matters of capacity development of politics without worrying much about "abstract" theory. One manifestation of naive realism is the pre-emotive "socialization" of CD ideas and practices. A process, which often spawns an attendant rhetorical over-simplification of difficult concepts, this socialisation is disabling as a method of both grasping capacity development ideas and rules in all their openness and complexity, and making the ideas tractable to transparent and sustainable institutional practice.

Another manifestation of the naive realist approach to transitions to CD in Africa is the simple equation of partisan elaboration of capacity development ideology with the production of ideas, values, and goals in civil society. Here, our attention and thought are diverted from the critical destination between, on the one hand, a system of abstract categories as a construct of an explicit rationalization, a formal conceptualisation and design, and, broad and diverse domains of ideology and purposefulness in the plenitude of social experience, on the other. We are discouraged from acknowledging the distance and tension between these two spheres of capacity development. Instead, one is led to believe that ideological construction in one sphere is reducible to ideological construction in the other.

Still another expression of naive realism in existing perspectives and projects of transition to capacity development in Africa is the common assumption that the proliferation of social organisations, mainly civil society organisations, is in and of itself, an index of capacity development. The assumption seems plausible. After all, what is more obvious in projects of capacity development transition in Africa than the goal of increasing the number of CSOs and other social institutions that will build stronger civil societies that will create favourable conditions for the growth of capacity development in the continent? Nevertheless, the assumption is open to question. The growing number and diversity of CSOs in Africa mean that the organisations have very uneven political and professional capabilities, and differing levels of commitment to processes of capacity development in Africa. They provide a range of social, humanitarian and relief services of varying proximity and relevance to the ends and purposes of capacity development reform.

Nevertheless, they do not function simply as instruments to those ends, but have their own inclinations, concerns and motivations, which capacity builders of African polities and societies must take into account. CSOs may be problematic in that far from contributing to the strengthening of civil society vis-à-vis the state, they can function as instruments for the consolidation of technocratic elite within the non-governmental sector. In addition, it appears that the proliferation of CSOs over the last decade has been more as outcome of funding by external donors than an indigenous "grassroots" phenomenon. Problems such as these constitute significant obstacles to the realization of the capacity development potential of African CSOs.

(2) **CSOs: agent or object of humanitarian action?** In the current drive for humanitarian pluralism in Africa, civil society and institutions within it are "foregrounded" as the arena, agents and instruments of the movement. Internal and external demands for humanitarian governance and the need to reform the indigenous state into a system of transparent practices have placed a heavy emphasis on social institutions as autonomous actors in these projects.[1] Society yields the spontaneous interests, demands, and institutional mechanisms of humanitarian governance. From this perspective, the state has only a limited role to play. Its function will not be to manage society's humanitarian aspirations and activities, but to create the enabling conditions for their free play. Institutions and groups in civil society must be allowed to form and run themselves. When they begin to address longer socio-economic and political issues beyond their limited sectional concerns, or to co-operate with the state on certain matters, they should be able to do so in terms of their specific interests and competence, not as mere instruments or extensions of governments.

Alternatively, the underdevelopment of civil society in Africa and the incapacities of institutions within it are seen as major barriers to democratisation. The activities of some social institutions may have the salutary effect of bringing into transparency the work of government, and of opening-up state institutions and practices to public suiting.[2] Nevertheless, the overall weakness of African civil societies is often cited as a fundamental structural constraint on humanitarian governance transformation in Africa. Rather than offering agents and arena of transitions to democracy, African civil societies are generally seen as objects and problems of reform. On account of this view, the state assumes a large role in democratisation. It is assigned the task of nothing less than "cultivating civil society" itself through political education and mobilization and other means. Government is not pushed to the background as society activates itself and leads the struggle for reform. Rather, the former acts on the latter, promotes, and manages the participation of individuals and groups in democratisation. We have here, then, two divergent representations of civil society accompanied by somewhat conflicting conceptions of the role of the state in the African passage to democracy. These are:

- 🔴 The perception of society as producer of the spontaneous interests, demands and institutional resources of change, to some degree, conflicts with the view of civil

[1] GCA / ALF, (1993) **transition to democracy in Africa: a cross-national study.**
[2] Costantinos, BT, (1993) "Priming the State". Paper presented to the ALF Forum on corruption. Kampala.

societies in Africa as weakly developed social and institutional structures in need of cultivation and support by the state.

- The conception of the state as creator of the enabling environment for the free democratic activities of individuals and groups diverges from the view of government as political educator and mobiliser of civil society.

Moreover, these conflicting perspectives commonly tend to confuse representations of "civil society" and "the state" as conceptual or ideal categories with actual communities and the regime fuelling the transition. The categories are often conflicted into the immediate stuff of African political and social experience. This is not to deny that there are representations of civil society and the state in current perspectives on democratisation in Africa where the elements categorized are more evidently those of really existing African social formations. It is to note a disabling analytical tendency in which the actualities of African politics (tribalism, the government of individuals and groups rather than the rule of laws and so on) tend to be pre-empted and displaced by the very conceptual categories used to describe them otherwise.

(3) **Inattention to problems of articulation of Capacity Development (CD) Systems**: When it is not dissolved into the immediate reality of political, often partisan, or ethnocentric activity, CD in Africa is likely to be represented as 'pure' principle that needs only proper 'application'. Practitioners and analysts of capacity development in the continent tend to pass over the particular nature of CD quickly in fragmentary presence in much of Africa, "adjusting" it against an ideal-general conception of what it might be. On the implicit, theoretically complacent assumption that formalistic, rhetorical modes of circulation of capacity development ideas and values in Africa nearly exhaust their articulation there, one often rushes to matters of 'implementation'. Consequently, critical problems concerning the philosophical and practical entrenchment of capacity development system and process in Africa receive scant attention. The fundamental issues of how the concepts, standards, and practices of capacity development rule could be generated and sustained under historically hectic conditions, and the manner in which they are likely to gain systemic integrity and autonomy as well as broad social currency are inadequately addressed.

**Insofar as existing perspectives on humanitarian reform in Africa neglect to pose the problem of articulation of CD as a relatively autonomous mode of analysis, CD would consist of a set of activities in which universal, mainly Western, concepts and standards of social and economic governance are neatly 'applied to', as distinct from produced or re-produced in African contexts and conditions...**

This relative inattention leads analysts and practitioners to make internal observations and assessments in terms of the capacity development performances of African polities without raising the question of setting up or securing the polities as capacity development systems in the first place. Capacity must actually exist, take definite shape and structure, and become a working process, before particular criticisms, claims, and demands can be based on it. Even at the level of application alone, it is largely overlooked that international models may enter Government and societies in Africa through a proliferation of programmes and mechanisms that hinder the growth of open and effective transition process thus retarding the development of indigenous CD-system experience and capacity.

Whether capacity development in Africa is defined in terms of individual action or collective rights, government policy or citizen action, private value or public norm, the upshot of the relative inattention to problems of articulation of open capacity development systems and processes in itself makes CD at once the most concrete of idea systems. Within current projects of political reform, capacity development is either conventionalised or sterilized on terrain of theory and often vacuously formalised on the ground of practice. It enters African polities and society in relatively abstract and plain form, yet is expected to land itself to immediate and vital African polity's socio-political experience. *It suggests itself, seems within reach only to elude, and appears readily practicable only to resist realization.*

c) **CSO – State relations**:

The long ancestry of the military in African history and its pivotal place in the social fabric was attended by a high degree of militarism. To be a soldier, to bear arms, has always remained a sign of manly distinction. The fact that military service was also rewarded with tributary rights over or outright grants of land gave the ingrained military ethos a solid economic basis. Military discipline and Marxist-Leninist ideology combined to breed a national culture of conformity and uniformity. It was against this background that civic-based liberation forces everywhere in Africa committed to a long struggle and won a war against mighty police and military aristocracies. Recognition of this fact would represent a significant improvement in our consciousness and practice. The passage to democracy in Africa is political development problematique because of the limited "democratic" exposure, "underdeveloped" civil society, and high levels of illiteracy and shortcomings that stem in part from historical and structural conditions marked by authoritarian traditions.

Indeed the end of the Cold War marked the dismantling of these state power oligarchies and the titans who presided on humankind's most appalling era of distress and despair. As we entered the decade of the Nineties, ordinary Africans witnessed a unique era emerging in human history testifying to the systematic disintegration of totalitarianism and with them the miraculous reprieve of humanity that tend to relegate earlier `great 'events in history to the backstage. Advances in human thought and action towards global justice and universalisation of guarantees for human rights, were gathering added momentum with the motive energy contributed by these unprecedented events. The ability of states to strip people of their rights to livelihoods security, behind the thin veneer **'non interference in each other's internal affairs'** was increasingly being challenged.

It is an opportunity for CSOs to marshal their experience and knowledge to play a constructive role in national development; in the same way, CSOs have contributed to build the solid edifice of nationhood and sustainable livelihoods in the North. The requisite commitment to participate in development - to ending poverty and promoting democracy and human rights has never been more opportune and feasible. The fundamental perception, that people, participation, and democracy must be the handmaiden of Africa's development mission and vision is a major underpinning of a paradigm of a negotiating trend towards a total reorientation of national policies. It is also re-imagining the role of civil society in development - for which experiences have already been got -- some exhilaratingly revolutionary and helpful, some of them wrong but unwittingly instructive. States must recognise this constitutive tenet: that development springs from the collective imagination, experiences and decision of people; once more testifying to how critical, it is for development to proceed from the cultural make-up, skills, needs and aspirations of individuals and communities.

The relation between state institutions, civil society organisations and the citizen have hitherto been characterised by invasion of civic space by the state and its structures. Indigenous organisations already present a substantial challenge to the state. CSOs liaise with the state with extreme caution; especially given the growing conviction that they are a component of a cohesive, purpose oriented, social and organisational people's base. Some CSOs are even looked upon in many countries as 'anti-state organisations'. Typically, single-party states neither tolerated nor recognised any other centres of power within society apart from the party and state, which had become almost synonymous. People's organisations were tolerated only as long as they adhered to the State's definition of development or existed to provide alternative conduits of foreign aid. As we stand on the watershed of the Third Millennium, the relations between citizens and state institutions have to be situated within an overall analysis of their roles.

Today, as in the early days right after the 1984 great African famine, states became interested in the NGO movement and began to take them seriously. In some countries, the contribution of the sector reached to more than 50% of foreign earning including ODA. International NGOs and peoples organisations in the form of humanitarian action groups, co-operatives and village help committees flourished; some with genuine interest in civil society empowerment, others under the guise of socialist development. The main issue in state-citizens relations is whether the state has the capacity and the will to relate to citizens and citizens groups based on mutual respect, autonomy, equality, and trust. The relationship between people's organisation and state is charac-

terised by positions of unequal power, making it very tempting for the state to dictate conditions and terms of relationships. The real problem is when the states have to figure out how to relate advocacy, people's organisations which are engaged in championing environmental issues, consciousness raising on the root causes of their problems and institutional development among the indigenous communities. In several countries, the relationship has not been smooth sailing. In the past, the institutional strife between the two actors was quite visible, at times assuming national dimensions, while in Africa; NGOs have been systematically discouraged from building grassroots connections. States have responded to increasing pressure from citizens and people's organisations with intimidation and harassment. The nature of this harassment could be indirect, using existing legal instruments and machinery to serve the interest of the state. The most common state harassment comes in the form of anonymity of CSOs contribution to relief, rehabilitation, and development.

d) **International legal provisions and instruments:**

   i) **African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights**: The charter underpins that the African States, parties to the Convention entitled "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights reaffirmed states' their adherence to the principles of human and peoples' rights and freedoms. These are contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the AU, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and the United Nations.

   ii) **Provisions common to the Geneva Conventions:** Extract from "Basic rules of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols" (ICRC). 'Field of application, duration of application, general principles of law'. The Conventions and the Protocol are applicable in case of declared war or of any other armed conflict arising between two or more of the Parties to the Conventions and Protocol I from the beginning of such a situation, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. These agreements also cover armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination. [I, 2; II, 2; III, 2; IV, 2; P. I, 1] The application ceases at the general close of military operations and, in occupied territories, at the end of the occupation except for those categories of people whose final release, repatriation or settlement takes place at a later date. These people shall continue to benefit from the relevant provisions of the Conventions and the Protocol until their final release, repatriation, or settlement. [I, 5; III, 5; IV, 6; P. I, 3]. In cases not covered by the Conventions, the Protocol or other international agreements, or in the case of denunciation of these agreements, *civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.* [P. I, 1 ; I, 63; II, 62; III, 142; IV, 158]

e) **Humanitarian Codes of Practice**

   i) *The legitimacy of the provider*: Any discussion on strengthening the right of organizations to provide assistance must at some point address the issue of those organizations' legitimacy and competence. Before pursuing this question, however, there is a more fundamental issue, which both individuals and agencies involved in humanitarian assistance need to recognize. As one writer has put it, the business of humanitarian assistance is driven by two ethics, that of the priest and that of the prophet. In many ways, humanitarianism is a moral code: the priests among the humanitarian community tend to want to codify it, to define the business, set standards, and specify who can and who cannot provide assistance. The prophets, in contrast, believe that providing humanitarian assistance is the responsibility of all people. They seek to spread this message and stimulate humanitarian action at the grass roots level. Of course, both approaches are needed. The creed of the priests can survive only if a certain degree of commitment is generated by the prophets. Moreover, one could legitimately argue that while all individuals have a duty to render impromptu assistance to the best of their ability when they see suffering, once that assistance takes the shape of an organized, professional programme, codes, rules, and standards are needed to safeguard the rights of the individual.

   ii) *International mechanisms to ensure quality*: Any system of rights intended to legitimize the role of non-State providers of assistance must devise a way of ensuring that they are legitimate and competent, and work in the interests of disaster victims. No such mechanism yet exists. The code of conduct drawn up in 1994 and widely recognized by both NGOs and States

goes a short way in this direction but not nearly far enough. However, a recent initiative, emerging from an extensive coalition of humanitarian agencies, promises to bring us much closer to the goal of objective quality assurance in humanitarianism.

iii) **The Sphere Project**

(1) *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards* is the result of cooperation between various independent agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance, including most major NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Its aim is to define basic practical standards that should govern humanitarian assistance, specifically that immediately relevant to saving lives, such as water and sanitation, food, health care and shelter. Such minimum standards already exist for many areas of humanitarian work. The problem is that there are often different standards competing with each other, or that the existing standards are out-of-date or incomplete. The Sphere Project is the first initiative to provide a coherent and complete set of standards to which a wide range of agencies are prepared to agree and against which their performance can be measured. Using basic human rights as its foundation, the Sphere Project seeks to erect an edifice consisting of clearly defined levels of assistance and the competence required to deliver it. This is intended to serve as a yardstick for humanitarian agencies in planning and assessment. Meeting critical human needs and restoring people's dignity are core principles for all humanitarian action and establishing an explicit link between fundamental human rights and humanitarian principles on the one hand, and clearly defined standards.

(2) *Accountability and effectiveness*: The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards also reflect the determination of humanitarian agencies to make their work more effective and improve the way they report to their sponsors. In agreeing to abide by these standards, humanitarian agencies commit themselves not only to providing defined levels of service but also to being held accountable for their actions. The standards are designed with this in mind and each is accompanied by a series of measurable indicators, which are important for not only planning and implementing programmes, but also for giving disaster victims, agency staff, donors, the wider public and others, the possibility to assess the services provided under those programmes. Thus, the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards provide a practical framework for accountability.

(3) *Applying the Minimum Standards*: The Minimum Standards apply to any situation in which, owing to natural or man-made disaster, people have lost the means by which they are normally able to support themselves with a degree of dignity. The standards apply specifically to the acute phase of an emergency and describe what people have a right to expect during that period. They specify the minimum acceptable levels for water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site selection, and health services. They have been made as specific as possible while remaining widely applicable to different emergencies. Communities hosting those displaced by disasters or conflicts are by definition also affected by such calamities and they too may need assistance. The Minimum Standards therefore apply to both populations. The burden of responsibility for providing humanitarian relief falls on many shoulders. The people directly affected by a disaster are always those who respond first in any crisis. Yet it is the duty of states and aid agencies to demonstrate political will in preventing, mitigating, and alleviating disasters. When people's support systems are no longer able to cope, assistance from agencies is required.

**4) Shaping a new Paradigm**

a) Introduction

From Darfur to the jungles of the River Zaire, from the Eritrean plateau to South Sudan, from trouble Somalia to the genocidal communities of Rwanda and Burundi, from the violent cities and borders of Kenya to Northern Uganda; new faces and forces of vulnerability and poverty haunt the Greater Horn of Africa sub-region. Conflicts, corruption, disasters, poverty, and pandemics now threaten the sub-region with a calamity unforeseen even during the Great African Famine of the 1980s, so much so, that the G8 has made this a basket case for international action. While many proposals for remedial action have been formulated for such vulnerability and poverty that haunt the sub-region, real commitment to collaborative processes at the inter-organisational level has always been limited. Mobilising the action required has also remained a daunting challenge, as

many practical and structural constraints militate against commitment by individual groups to inter-organisational initiatives nationally and regionally.

The tragedy, which took such a heavy toll of life over the past years, has highlighted the fundamental weakness of the peace, security, and development strategies. Many conventional and preconceived notions have been questioned and new ideas proposed. Efforts have also been made to improve one's understanding of vulnerabilities, to estimate the risks resulting there from more accurately and to make adequate preventive measures against insecurity, ahead of time. In this sense, the traditional role of humanitarian organisations has been harshly, even cruelly, tested.

The need for collective learning about responses, and the responsibility to those whose suffering provided the basis for that learning will never be more urgent than it is now. Unfortunately, such lessons, which may be learned through the shocks administered by an uncompromising reality, are rarely translated quickly into personal or organisational memories and the inherent will to change. The reasons for this are sometimes rooted in human inertia, weakness, and self-interest. They are equally often the products of a genuine confusion about how to act most effectively in an environment that seems to be growing more complex. To every human problem in Africa, there is always a solution that is smart, simple, and immoral. Important stakeholders tend to have a linear way of thinking that is inadequate to unravel the many complex inter-relationships underlying people's insecurity. It is neither popular nor scientific. The need for the fundamental change on how the global community deals with the internecine crises must change since places such as Darfur, Somalia and DRC, to name a few, have become a new insignia of 'bestiality'. It must take, within the premises of Human Security,

- the Responsibility to Protect and the Right to Assistance;
- encourage appropriate action for promoting and managing an enabling environment for human development;
- Mainstream peace, security a developmental response in the drive for popular participation – people acting as citizens of a political society, reinforcing ownership of security and ensuring livelihood continuity;

Hence, the need to advocate for the development of think tanks that would set the stage for the paradigmatic development of internal models of growth and human welfare. While member states have put in motion constitutional and policy instruments that ensure human security, nonetheless, real commitment to national and sub-regional action that must foster processes by which nations, communities and individuals grow stronger, are able to enjoy fuller and more productive lives, and become less vulnerable to the scourges of insecurity action is yet to come.

b) **Addressing the paradigmatic crises**:

i) The business of humanitarian assistance is driven by two ethics, that of the priest and that of the prophet. In many ways, it is a moral code: the priests among the humanitarians tend to want to codify it, to define the business, set standards, and specify who can and who cannot provide assistance. The prophets, in contrast, believe that providing humanitarian assistance is the responsibility of all people. They seek to spread this message and stimulate more action at the grassroots level. Of course, both approaches are needed. The creed of the priests can survive only if a certain degree of commitment is generated by the prophets. Moreover, one could legitimately argue that while all individuals have a duty to render impromptu assistance to the best of their ability, once that assistance takes the shape of an organised, professional programme, codes, rules, and standards are needed to safeguard the rights of the individual. In shaping a new paradigm, there is the imperative to address first and foremost the paradigmatic crisis:

(1) a tendency to narrow capacity development thought and practice to the terms and categories of immediate, not very well considered, political and social action, a naive realism, as it were;

(2) inattention to problems of articulation or production of capacity development systems and process within African polities rather than simply as formal or abstract possibilities;

(3) ambiguity as to whether civil society is the agent or object of CD and a nearly exclusive concern in certain institutional perspectives on CD in Africa with generic attributes and characteristics of political organisations and consequent neglect of analysis in terms of

specific strategies and performances of organisations in processes of transition to capacity;

(4) inadequate treatment of the role of international agencies and the relations between global and indigenous aspects or dimensions of humanitarian CD;

## ii) **Polarity between historical and 'new' ideological arenas**

The polarity between historical and ideological bases of humanitarian interventions can serve the critical purpose of evaluating traditional values and assumptions against the categories and models of modern, libertarian humanitarianism, and of correcting the limitations of those values. It can help to emphasise the important point that our collective memory and experience as a continent should not constitute a drag on our present capacity for change and development. Nevertheless, this is not possible so long as the current trendiness construes, as it does, the relation between historical and ideological bases of humanitarianism in simple opposition terms and attempts to limit our national consciousness entirely to the present.

The problem with the portrayal of the 1984/85 'Band Aid' humanitarian response to the Great African Famine for developmental change, then, is that certain processes, implicitly or explicitly, prevent the tradition from entering into meaningful 'dialogue' with contemporary humanitarian politics. This emphasis or over-emphasis really, is the other side of the equally exaggerated, overly-politicised identification of humanitarian tradition with the emerging paradigm -- hence, the avant-garde demand that humanitarianism be 'born again', and 'born different'.

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that this demand, along with the highly negative and overly politicised view of the historical process of developing the humanitarianism percept, constitutes the spontaneous response of humanitarian actors to their incorporation into the broader polity. However important these themes are, they do not have monolithic content or absolute form. They are a partial, variable, and potentially negotiable political articulation produced by a particular organisation in a specific humanitarian crisis context. They need not and should not be invoked by anyone in non-negotiable terms. They represent a contingent, contestable closure, which should not be passed off as flat, indisputable necessity. The lessening of the politicisation of humanitarian work and the consequent lowering of the ideological-thematic noise level on the issue, may indeed create a more favourable condition for pluralist  thought, discourse and practice. It may make possible consideration of alternative ways of fixing the content and form of humanitarianism. Even if humanitarians agree on the definition of specific problems, their solutions, or mode of concern about will vary considerably. Which raises the questions:

- How and by whom are the issues of humanitarian politics framed and identities and differences set?
- What effects have such ideologies and practice on indigenous communities and cultures?

The points made above regarding identification of problems of change apply to the setting of goals and tasks and their problem-solving activities. The solutions, like problems, can be seen in large part as elements, features, and effects of an Africanist avant-garde tradition. They have taken shape and come into play as the articulation and operation a particular doctrine. As such, one can say that, in the main, they has been able to set themselves only such goals, to offer only such solutions, as are given or implied by the problems. This means that the objectives formulated do not represent purely or primarily idiosyncratic agendas. They are conditioned by a set of formulas and conventions belonging to the revolutionary tradition. In large measure, they represent aims and purposes constituted by that tradition according to an internal rationality of its own.

The particularities of deeply felt 'humanitarian' wrongs and of political projects aimed at righting them are important here. Nevertheless, these are so 'mediated' and 'processed' by avant-garde rhetoric, doctrine, and organisational practice that they signify less spontaneous particulars than ideologically loaded and rehearsed elements. Often, they betray little in the contingencies of the lived experiences of humanitarian groups in Ethiopia, but manifest the more or less explicit general forms of the ideology at work, the mechanisms used in operating the ideology, and the character of the operation itself. Yet this intensive process of largely

ideological mediation has allowed the humanitarian-*cum*-development stalwarts to transpose uniquely 'humanitarian tribal' projects into concepts, goals, and methods of political work of humanitarianism, ostensibly applicable to all nations and people. In certain of its aspects, the process works as a schematic recreation of 'raw' traditions. It underlies the belief that particular humanitarian projects and experiences can be held out, without imperiousness or monopolisation, as a paradigm for the New Humanitarianism.

Political issues of self-reliance inevitably raise problems, which cannot be neatly enslaved within either any one of these contemporary humanitarian 'ideologies'. While they constitute more or less distinct organisational arenas, one cannot conclude from this that contemporary aspirations can be seen in isolation from or in opposition to issues and problems of the historic tradition of the eighties. They constitute broader elements, intersections, and consequences. The two forms of our experience are not necessarily incompatible; nor need they be in conflict. Rather, they may be mutually complementary, as would two images of the same terrain portrayed from alternative perspectives. This means that our problems need not be defined in terms of individual projects of self-reliance or the aggregate of such projects. They can be defined and addressed within a board-based multi-paradigmatic political process. In the end, the commitment of organisations to progressive ideas of humanitarianism does not compel them to use the categories of modern thought in a way that devalues and negates the collective memory and tradition. Their commitment to change does not necessarily entail a rejection of our collective heritage.

c) **Elements of the 'New Paradigm'**

i) **Human Security and African CSOs:**

(1) **Concepts:** Human security, a concept that emerged from a post-Cold War, multidisciplinary understanding of security involving a number of research fields, including development studies, international relations, strategic studies, and human rights. Critics of the concept argue that its vagueness undermines its effectiveness; that it has become little more than a vehicle for activists wishing to promote certain causes; and that it does not help the research community understand what security means or help decision makers to formulate good policies. The 1994 UNDP Report introduces a new concept of human security, which equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms. It examines both the national and the global concerns of human security and seeks to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of sustainable human development, capturing the potential peace dividend, a new form of development co-operation and a restructured system of global institutions. Increasing human security entails investing in human development, not in arms; engaging policy makers to address the emerging peace dividend; Giving the United Nations a clear mandate to promote and sustain development; enlarging the concept of development cooperation so that it includes all flows, not just aid; agreeing that 20 % of national budgets and 20 percent of foreign aid be used for human development; and establishing an Economic Security Council.

(2) **R2P -- from freedom from fear vs. freedom from want**: In an ideal world, each of the seven categories of threats would receive adequate global attention and resources. Yet attempts to implement this human security agenda have led to the emergence of two major schools of thought — "Freedom from Fear" and "Freedom from Want." While the 1994 HDR originally argued that human security requires attention to both *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want,* divisions have gradually emerged over the proper scope of that protection (e.g. over what threats individuals should be protected from) and over the appropriate mechanisms for responding to these threats. The Freedom from Fear School seeks to limit the practice of Human Security to protecting individuals from violent conflicts. This approach argues that limiting the focus to violence is a realistic and manageable approach towards Human Security. Emergency assistance, conflict prevention, and resolution, peace building are the main concerns of this approach. "Freedom from Want" school focuses on the basic idea that violence, poverty, inequality, diseases, and environmental degradation are inseparable concepts in addressing the root of human insecurity. Different from 'Freedom from Fear', it expands the focus beyond violence with emphasis

on development and security goals. Japan, for example, has adopted the broader "Freedom from Want" perspective in its own foreign policy and in 1999 established a UN trust fund for the promotion of Human Security.

(3) **R2P, Human and State Security:** Human security and state or national security is not mutually exclusive concepts. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice-versa.[3] State security is about a state's ability to defend itself against external threats. State security (often referred to as national security or state security) describes the philosophy of international security predominance since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the rise of the nation-states. While international relations theory includes many variants of state security, from realism to idealism, the fundamental trait that these schools share is their focus on the primacy of the nation-state. Human security also challenged and drew from the practice of international development. Traditionally, embracing liberal market economics was considered to be the universal path for economic growth, and thus development for all humanity. Yet, continuing conflict and human rights abuses following the end of the Cold War and the fact that two-thirds of the global population seemed to have gained little from the economic gains of globalization, led to fundamental questions about the way development was practiced. Under human security and R2P, poverty and inequality are considered root causes of individual vulnerability. Security and development are deeply interconnected.

*Human security forms an important part of people's well-being, and is therefore an objective of development.* An objective of development is 'the enlargement of human choices'. Insecurity cuts life short and thwarts the use of human potential, thereby affecting the reaching of this objective. *Lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth, and therefore development.* Some development costs are obvious. There are four main policy actions related to poverty and inequality that promote human security and R2P, encouraging growth that reaches the extreme poor; supporting sustainable livelihoods and decent work and providing social protection for all situations; children, women and human security and R2P and human Trafficking. The pursuit of human security and R2P begins on a point of principle, and with a hard fact of political life. The principle is that every person has a right to know their rights—and to know how to claim the protection of those rights. The political fact is that the powerless lack the means to make that claim, in part because they lack a voice in the decisions that govern their lives. These are the people at risk in any country, the people who must be empowered. Empowering people at risk answers the human security and R2P imperative by directing corrective policy and action to those whose security is most severely threatened.

(4) **Preparedness, prevention, and humanitarian response**: Prevention is another vital tenant of the human security and R2P paradigm. According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, "the international community spent approximately $200 billion on conflict management in seven major interventions in the 1990s... but could have saved $130 billion through a more effective preventive approach." The human security and R2P approach advocates that more efforts and resources need to be invested in *accurate knowledge of early warning*; *understanding of measures for prevention*; and *willingness to apply those measures*. Many efforts have been made to tackle these prerequisites.

(5) **Small Arms:** Implementing supply/demand strategies and curtailing the misuse of small arms and light weapons—the real weapons of mass destruction. The Track argues for better control and tracking of supply, and for the value of negotiating a global treaty regulating the small arms trade. Demand for small arms can be discouraged—and misuse suppressed—by improving community security, police conduct, and judicial performance. Where rights and personal safety are protected, people are less inclined to take up arms...

(6) **Terrorism:** the global threat of terrorism is an important test case for the Human Security agenda Proponents argues that a Human Security approach would alleviate many of the deficiencies in a traditional, state-centred counter terrorist approach. Traditional

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[3] UN. (2003) Human Security Now, Chapter 1: Final Report of the Commission on Human Security 2003, p.2-6

measures use sanctions or military force, against a specific country but not a specific target.

(7) **Diseases:** Human Security has long been argued that the "scope" of global security should be expanded to include the threat of infectious disease. The primary goal of human security and R2P is the protection of individuals, and infectious diseases are among the most serious threats to individuals around the world. Especially with the accelerating speed of globalization nowadays, the outbreak of one infectious disease in one particular country can be bought to the others quickly by the intensification of international transportation. Given the trans-national nature of infectious disease, the traditional unilateral, state-centred policy approaches to these threats by infectious diseases is ineffective over the long run. Therefore, adopting a people-centred Human Security model with its emphasis on prevention, individual empowerment, and treatment strategies delivered by an array of global actors is possibly a pioneering approach to deal with the increasing diversity of contagious diseases. Correcting state failures that lead to health failures, to enhance security especially against infectious and pandemic diseases.

**(8) Global warming:** Environmental degradation and extreme climates has direct impacts on human security and R2P as it means humans are prone to natural disasters and are faced with decreasing resources. In addition, as the earth's climate changes more rapidly, an increase in violent conflict is likely due to resource scarcity and an exacerbated North-South disparity. Sources of possible conflict include wide-spread refugee movement, a fall in global food production and reduction in water supply. Water and energy, for example, are essential resources, which have led to military and political turmoil worldwide. Altered resource availability causing food shortages results in political disputes, ethnic tensions and civil unrests, which in turn is the basis for regional conflicts that eventually goes global.

Furthermore, vulnerability to climate changes can be exacerbated by other non-climate factors such as R2P, poverty, unequal access to resources and economic globalization, making Human Security all the more susceptible. A more recent example of how global warming impacts human security is the Darfur conflict. Climate changes have brought the Sahara steadily into the south and droughts are more frequent in this piece of dry land, wiping out food produce. As a result, there is less arable land with many people fighting for it.

(9) **Rights to Assistance:** Many countries have promulgated a civil protection act in Africa. The acts "establish a civil protection organisation and provide for the operation of civil protection services in times of disaster; to provide for the establishment of a fund to finance civil protection; and to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing. This paper will analyse policy-level gaps, omissions, and issues in on the right to assistance and a need for policy and directives. The right to assistance policies should be designed in manner that relief assistance is provided to affected population in a manner which ensures that such efforts contribute towards disaster prevention and sustainable growth and development and that disaster prevention activities get due attention in the government's development efforts. This identified gap are be fulfilled by the following basic principles community determination of interventions; clear responsibility and empowerment at all levels; and relief shall sub-serve the goals of development.

These principles are entirely consistent with the basic themes of participation, empowerment, and responsibility as detailed in the general macro-policies of states. The policy also provides more detailed guidelines reflecting the reality of limited resources, resource allocation, and efficiency. Prioritisation of interventions is to be made on the basis of urgency and relief plans are to be approved at central government level.

Finally, there are policy prescriptions concerning eligibility for participation and the conditions for participation in disaster management activities - in particular relief activities. The policies include prescribing the government management structure, roles, and responsibilities at all levels and activity planning and implementation norms. Operationalisation of the policy requires institutionalisation of the policy at central, provincial, district, and ward and community levels.

## ii) Good practice notes for the emerging paradigm

### (1) Policy imperatives on the CSO right to access – AHA/ACHA cases:

The emphasis on this legal, policy, and strategy analysis and development exercise is on how decisions ought to be analysed and made, rather than on the details of the information that should serve as inputs to the decisions on the R2A. In establishing this framework, we rely heavily on analytic techniques developed in economics, mathematics, operations research, and system analysis. In actual practice, to be sure, policy analysis is much more broadly eclectic, drawing on a great variety of disciplines, including law, sociology, and political and organisational analysis.[4] We have a lot to say about these important complementary disciplines. Our concern here, however, is with how the decision maker should structure her/his thinking about a policy choice and with analytic models that will aid understanding and predication, not with all the disciplines that could conceivably provide helpful information. Questions of values are a critical and inevitable part of policy analysis.

The subject itself, policy analysis, is a discipline for working within a political and economic system, not for changing it and which regards the well-being of individuals as the ultimate objective of public policy. In this sense, we establish a framework for thinking about policy problems and making choices and focus on the use of models to represent real-world phenomena and the more general use analytic methods to assist in the entire process of making decisions. We also provide a background against which policy analysis can be viewed, considering critical ethical questions: who should make those policy choices, and on what basis? It lays out the basic criteria for policy choice, identifies the circumstances in which the government should play a role in allocating the resources of society, and reviews briefly alternative forms that government intervention might take. The following five-part framework is suggested as a starting point.

(a) Establishing the Contest: What is the underlying problem that must be dealt with? What specific objectives are to be pursued in confronting the problem of natural disasters and regional co-ordination mechanisms?

(b) Laying Out the Alternatives: What are alternative courses of action? A disaster management centre? A regional mechanism for co-ordination? A do nothing new approach? Or a combination of the three? What are the possibilities for gathering further information to determine which scenario is better?

(c) Predicting the Consequences: What are the consequences of each of alternative actions? What techniques are relevant for predicating these consequences? If outcomes are uncertain, what is the estimated likelihood of each?

(d) Valuing the Outcomes: by what criteria should we measure success in pursuing each objective? Recognising that inevitably some alternatives are superior to other, how should different combinations of valued objectives be compared with one another?

(e) Making a Choice. Drawing all aspects of analysis together, a preferred course of action;

This is not to imply that analysis will always proceed in an orderly fashion from one stage of analysis to the next. Real life does not present such an opportunity and rarely operates so neatly. The conduct of an analysis will usually turn out in practice to be an iterative process, with analyst(s) working back and fourth among the tasks of identifying problems, establishing criteria, and valuing trade-offs, to refine analysis. This is an entirely sensible approach. It is easier to keep track of where you are in this iterative process, and to avoid to going around in circles if one keeps in mind a basic framework to which every aspect of analysis must be related.

## iii) Principles for Humanitarian Policy Determination

### (1) Popular Participation: While popular participation through civil defence organisation sis recognised by many African countries, the percept of popular participation is not put

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[4] Stockey, E. and Zeckhauser, R. 1978. A primer for policy analysis. W.W. Norton and Co. NY

within the context of a process of self-empowerment, a transformation in the social milieu, policy dialogue, staff awareness and organisational culture. Participation implies community commitment, mutual decision making, individual and collective innovativeness, local resource generation, contribution, and legitimate community organisations to preside on these collective will and decisions of community members. Inspired by this *new orthodoxy*, an emerging paradigm on the ideals of people centred development, disaster coping mechanisms and prevention, the eighties have provided a fertile ground for the discourse on the subject of human vulnerabilities in Africa.

(2) **Relief-Development Continuum:** The lessons learned so far has enabled us to break fresh grounds in the new conceptualisation of the *relief - development - sustainability continuum,* paving the way for the furtherance of development preparedness modalities and the practical underpinning of the development-people nexus itself. The new orthodoxy of development demands important attitudinal shifts among thinkers and policy makers to the devolution of decision-making to communities. The desire to address *the new orthodoxy*, assumes that while the severe consequences of economic under development, cannot, in the short-term, be eliminated, their effects can be substantially minimised; by linking, wherever possible, far-reaching development initiatives with short-term preparedness measures at the grassroots.

> **Communities shall play the leading role in the planning, programming, implementation, and evaluation of all relief projects, and formal institutions' role in this regard would be subservient to this. Many countries appreciate the fact that relief must be addressed to the most needy at all times and no free distribution of aid is allowed to able-bodied affected population.**

(3) **Assessment**: This is perhaps where the main weaknesses of policies and strategies of the relief development continuum can be seen. Urgency of different measures is not carefully assessed and resources are not deployed for the more urgent measures and precedence is not given to areas where lives and livelihoods are more threatened.

(4) **Focal Points:** Many countries have policies that clearly define focal points of action for different tasks at different levels. They have also rules that ensure that centres of co-ordination are properly empowered. Nevertheless, the main principle of the institutional arrangement is not decentralisation of responsibilities. This is to mean

> *the transfer of legal, administrative, and political authority to make decisions and manage public functions from the central government to field organisations: subordinate units of government, semiautonomous public corporations, area-wide development authorities, functional authorities, autonomous local governments, or non-governmental organisations is inadequate.*

(5) **Integration:** There shall be an integrated approach in the formulation and implementation of relief programmes. Relief programmes, touching on different aspects of economic life, shall sub-serve the goals of development and build up assets of the community. Departments dovetail relief projects into their long-term plans and bring a congruence of approach, strategy, and techniques. As part of the long-term development effort, appropriate prevention plans and programmes shall be devised for disaster prone areas in order to eliminate the root causes of their vulnerability. While such policies have been put in motion in many African countries, other bureaucratic entanglements have hampered their implementation. Disaster shall be declared when convincing and complete socio-economic reports from regional councils and the National Early Warning System are provided. National level declaration for disaster is made by some committees such as the National Disaster Preparedness Committee. The commencement of relief measures shall automatically follow the declaration of disaster in an area.

iv) **ACHA: Research-Outreach Interface (ROI) on Sustainable Livelihoods[5]**

(1) Backgrounder: The African Centre for Humanitarian Action (ACHA) aims to promote the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach through the Evidence-based policy in Development Network as an integrated package of policy, technology and investment strategies together with appropriate decision-making tools which are used together to promote sustainable livelihoods by building on local adaptive strategies. ACHA is targeting the production of knowledge on current and priority issues within ACHA in order to better feed into the requirements of participatory assessment, planning, and research-outreach interface (ROI) in its strategic and programme management, policy formulation and the results-oriented exercise. To meet this goal ACHA has proposed an evaluative research programme designed to be more flexible and responsive and have a shorter turn-around time than the strategic or thematic evaluation formats. Above all, the ROI aims to be a dynamic learning process, feeding knowledge inputs into ongoing advocacy, programme and other processes within the organisation in real time and will tackle large conceptual or thematic issues or more immediate and narrow concerns, depending on what is demanded by the organisation and, more importantly, by the country CSOs.

(2) From this discussion and other consultations, a number of priority topics have emerged for structuring an ROI. The following four topics have been earmarked by the ACHA as the most relevant for study at this time: rules and institutions, linkage between macro-policies and micro-level initiatives, definition and measurement issues and dexterity to meet goals. The Research Protocol for the ROI is intended as a concise statement of what is expected of each in country programme. It presents questions, guidelines, and issues which each study site must address and adhere to. In order to realize the goals and objectives of the adaptive strategy initiative, researchers will seek to capture the synergies arising out of the interaction between contemporary and indigenous knowledge, and the conditions and processes, which produce and reinforce community-based conflict management. The ROI is a large undertaking that provides the ACHA with many opportunities for forming beneficial partnerships and contributing to the learning process of the organisation. As such, the ACHA has devised a potential timetable, which will remain tentative until all consultations and input from partners have been received

(3) Evaluative Research Programme on Sustainable livelihoods: ACHA aims to promote the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach through the Evidence-based policy in Development Network as an integrated package of policy, technology and investment strategies together with appropriate decision-making tools which are used together to promote sustainable livelihoods by building on local adaptive strategies. ACHA is targeting the production of knowledge on current and priority issues within ACHA in order to better feed into the requirements of participatory assessment, planning, and research-outreach interface in its strategic and programme management, policy formulation and the results-oriented exercise. To meet this goal ACHA has proposed an evaluative research programme (ROI). This programme is designed to be more flexible and responsive and have a shorter turn-around time than the strategic or thematic evaluation formats. Above all, the ROI aims to be a dynamic learning process.

ROI will feed knowledge inputs into ongoing advocacy, programme, and other processes within the organisation in real time. The programme will tackle large conceptual or thematic issues or more immediate and narrow concerns, depending on what is demanded by the organisation and, more importantly, by the country CSOs. In this sense, ROI is a modular approach with each part being self-contained in scope and composition and making use of the most appropriate methodology. The needs of ACHA will shape the programme itself. Quick turn-around time and addressing the most pressing needs of the ACHA clients, the ACHA country offices, are the prime functions of the ROI. Considerable time often elapses between the formulation of thematic or strategic evaluations and feed-

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[5] BT Costantinos, PhD, (2008). Research-Outreach Interface on Sustainable Livelihoods, 'Locating the Power of In-Between' Conference 'Between Ourselves' Workshop, Centurion, South Africa, July 1st to 4th. The Human Sciences Resource Council with the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex in the UK

ing the lessons of the evaluation into the policy/strategy chain. While these evaluations serve a critical purpose in the learning process of ACHA by providing exhaustive studies on a subject, certain emerging demands and pressing concerns in the organisation require a new type of evaluation, which responds in real time to the knowledge needs of the organisation. The ROI, therefore, is designed to provide "just enough knowledge, just in time to those who need it."

The programme will make use of a number of different modalities depending on the needs of the topic at hand – including thematic reviews, rapid appraisals, action research, synthesis notes, tracer studies, as well as workshops, brainstorming sessions and seminars. It will draw on a wide range of resources such as in-house expertise, network-based consultations with well-known scholars and practitioners on the subject, external consultants, outsourcing to credible institutions of both the developing and developed world. The first ROI planned by the ACHA will focus on ACHA's work in sustainable livelihoods. Poverty alleviation has long been an area in which ACHA has been a recognized leader. The organisation has been at the vanguard of theory and practice – advocating pro-poor initiatives, participation, and good governance. Furthermore, this issue is particularly timely. The organisation is seeking to narrow its focus to areas in which it can demonstrate a comparative advantage. Therefore, the ROI will be conducted in such a way as to contribute to each of these processes and events and will provide some important lessons in the critical area of sustainable livelihoods. ACHA, therefore, found it particularly opportune to examine sustainable livelihoods now and ensure that ACHA moves forward by bringing its experience and theory together and continuing to provide the best programmes possible for the poor.

ACHA engaged in a number of discussions in order to identify key issues in sustainable livelihoods that could be examined in an ROI. The first formal discussion took place in 2006. Participants included members of the ACHA, other AHA and poverty experts from major universities and development institutions. The brainstorming raised a number of questions that warrant further probing and assessment in order to bring clarity to ACHA's approach to poverty. The conceptual debate at the meeting revolved around four major research-outreach interface issues:

- **Conjectural versus effective**: ACHA has contributed to the field of sustainable livelihoods through complex conceptual ideas but has not as clearly defined an operational strategy for sustainable livelihoods. More attention needs to be paid to operationalising the poverty related concepts of ACHA.

- **Dexterity to meet objectives**: The goals and targets set by the ACHA sustainable livelihoods strategy documents (e.g. the Strategic Results Framework) do not always take into account ACHA staff's skill capacity. An examination of ACHA skills and proper alignment of this capacity with the organisation's goals is needed.

- **Capacity Issues**: While the notion of Human Poverty has contributed to the field of sustainable livelihoods greatly, it still loses ground to income poverty notions at the operational level due to difficulties in measurement. While a broad, multi-dimensional definition of poverty is clearly necessary – measuring this notion is highly complex. An operational measurement of human poverty is needed.

- **Comparative SWOT**: Given a limited amount of funding and capacity, ACHA needs to properly assess its strengths and focus on them. One area of strength for ACHA that was identified was pro-poor governance. This broad area, which encompasses both policy definition and advocacy at the national level as well as support for participation and social mobilisation at the local level, is an important area of ACHA work.

The following four topics have been earmarked by the ACHA as the most relevant for study at this time. An examination of these topics can contribute to the current debate within sustainable livelihoods, which has provided ACHA with a country-based analytical perspective on the issues in sustainable livelihoods: rules and institutions: institution building, linkage between Macro-policies and Micro-level Initiatives, definition and measurement issues and skills to meet goals.